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EQUAL PROTECTION-THE LOUISIANA EXPERIENCE IN DEPARTING FROM
GENERALLY ACCEPTED FEDERAL ANALYSIS
In 1985, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Sibley v. Board of Su-
pervisors of Louisiana State University' reinterpreted the Louisiana Con-
stitution's individual dignity clause, our state's equal protection provision.2
The federal three-tiered approach for determining whether a statute
violates an individual's right to equal protection of the law, which had
formerly been employed by Louisiana courts, was abandoned by the
supreme court. The court recognized that the language and history of
the individual dignity clause required that the individual enjoy broader
protections under the clause than under the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.3 Likewise,
the court, reflecting its own dissatisfaction with the federal analysis,
acknowledged the criticisms often directed at that method.4 The supreme
court formulated a new approach that afforded the intended level of
protection and avoided the pitfalls inherent in the federal approach.,
The purpose of this paper is to examine the use of the Sibley test
by both the Louisiana Supreme Court and the lower appellate courts.
Copyright 1989, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 477 So. 2d 1094, rev'g 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985). Sibley in this paper refers to
the case as decided on rehearing. When the paper discusses the original hearing opinion,
it will be so noted.
2. La. Const. art. I, § 3, provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall
discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or
affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate
against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or
political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited,
except in the latter case as punishment for crime.
3. 477 So. 2d at 1107. See Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of
1973. Convention Transcripts Vol. VI, Aug. 29, 1973, p. 1017 and Aug. 30, 1973, p.
1029.
4. These criticisms included complaints of rigidity in deciding which "level of scru-
tiny" applied to a challenged law, and complaints that the law in question is often
pigeonholed into a particular level of scrutiny, thereby precluding any substantive analysis.
See B. Schwartz, Constitutional Law 374 (2d ed. 1979); Shaman, Cracks in the Structure:
The Coming Breakdown of Levels of Scrutiny, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 161 (1984). See generally
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-2 (2d ed. 1988). Level of scrutiny refers to
the federal three-tiered system wherein the court determines which level of review (minimal,
strict or intermediate) it will use in considering the constitutionality of a statute. For an
application of that test, see Sibley, 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985).
5. 477 So. 2d at 1108.
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An effort is made to determine whether the new method has created
any substantive change in Louisiana equal protection analysis, and whether
the Sibley test has achieved the desired goal of protecting the individual
more than the federal analysis had.6
EQUAL PROTECTION IN LOuISIANA BEFORE SIBLEY
Before 1974
Prior to the 1974 Constitution, Louisiana law contained no express
guarantee of equal protection. Individuals with equal protection claims
were protected only by the federal guarantee of equal protection found
in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Con-
sequently, those claims were judged solely by the federal standard.
The hallmark of the federal model is the three-tiered system under
which challenged laws are scrutinized. 7 The three levels generally are
referred to as minimal, strict, and intermediate. A court begins its
analysis of a challenged law by choosing the appropriate level of scrutiny
based upon the unique characteristics of the law challenged.
Strict scrutiny is applied when the law" under review adversely affects
6. This comment addresses almost exclusively the jurisprudence that has arisen under
the auspices of the Sibley test; however, there is an even larger body of case law in
which the courts have been completely unaware that Sibley is "on the books" and now
controls in the equal protection arena. See, e.g., Jones v. Thibodeaux, 488 So. 2d 945
(La. 1986); Succession of Davis, 509 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 513
So. 2d 821 (1987); Jenkins v. Whitfield, 505 So. 2d 83 (La, App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
506 So. 2d 114 (1987); Redding v. Essex Crane Rental Corp. of Alabama, 500 So. 2d
880 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986), writ denied, 501 So. 2d 774 (1987); Central Louisiana Bank
& Trust Co. v. Avoyelles Parish Police Jury, 493 So. 2d 1249 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986);
Maltby v. Gauthier, 489 So. 2d 396 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds,
506 So. 2d 1190 (1987); Lor, Inc. v. Martin Exploration Co., 489 So. 2d 1326 (La. App.
1st Cir.), writ denied, 493 So. 2d 1217 (1986).
7. This system's origins can be traced to the United States Supreme Court's reaction
to the "court packing" plan that President Roosevelt threatened to use when portions
of his New Deal legislation were invalidated as unconstitutional. The Court greatly reduced
its previous role of judicial activism by adopting a deferential attitude toward Congress'
legislation, giving it a presumption of constitutionality. See generally Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 75 S. Ct. 461 (1955); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578 (1937). While a detailed discussion of the finer points and
nuances of the Supreme Court's three tiered analysis might be desirable at this juncture,
commentators have been known to devote chapters to the subject. See generally J. Nowak,
R. Rotunda and J. Young, Constitutional Law § 14 (3d ed. 1986); B. Schwartz, supra
note 4, ch. 9; L. Tribe, supra note 4, § 16 (2d ed. 1988). For the purposes of this
comment, this rather cursory overview should suffice.
8. Of course, the governmental action attacked may be something other than a piece
of legislation. For clarity and brevity, law will be used as shorthand for all forms of
governmental action that could be subject to an equal protection attack.
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a "fundamental right" 9 or creates a "suspect classification." 10 Under
this standard, the court does not presume the constitutionality of the
law and will uphold it only if the discrimination is necessarily related
to a compelling state interest. Many commentators have noted that when
a reviewing court employs strict scrutiny, the result nearly always is
fatal to the law under attack."
The courts have applied an intermediate scrutiny level in situations
when a "quasi-suspect classification '1 2 is recognized. Intermediate scru-
tiny requires a showing that the law is substantially related to an im-
portant governmental interest.
Finally, courts use minimum scrutiny to determine the constitution-
ality of laws that do not impact a "suspect classification,"', 3 a "quasi-
suspect classification,' ' 4 or infringe upon a "fundamental right."' 5 This
deferential level of scrutiny requires the reviewing court to inquire whether
the law is rationally related to the legislature's goal in enacting it; any
conceivable rational relation 6 sustains the constitutionality of the law.
9. "Fundamental rights" deserving strict scrutiny include the following: the right to
freedom of speech and association, see, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 78 S. Ct. 1163 (1958); the right to interstate movement and travel, see, e.g.,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322 (1969); the right to vote, see, e.g.,
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Election, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S. Ct. 1079 (1966); the right to
fairness in criminal adjudication, see, e.g. Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 92 S. Ct.
410 (1971); the right to procreation, see, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62
S. Ct. 1110 (1942). See generally Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S. Ct. 780
(1971) (including the right to privacy and the right to equal opportunity to litigate);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970).
10. "Suspect classifications" include: race, see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193 (1944), and ancestry or alienage, see, e.g., Massachusetts Bd.
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976). Other classifications have
been proposed as candidates for similar strict scrutiny, see San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 61, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1310 (1973) (Stewart, J. concurring)
(indigency); cf. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S. Ct. 872 (1973) (illegitimacy).
11. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 8 (1972). See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
319, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2569 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda, and
J. Young, supra note 7, § 14.3; L. Tribe, supra note 4, § 16-6. The Sibley court also
acknowledged those criticisms. 477 So. 2d at 1105-06.
Only once has the Supreme Court upheld clear racial discrimination. See Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193 (1944).
12. The primary example of a "quasi-suspect classification" is discrimination based
on gender. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976); cf. Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S. Ct. 1764 (1973).
13. See supra note 10.
14. See supra note 12.
15. See supra note 9.
16. See, e.g., J. Nowak, R. Rotunda and J. Young, supra note 7, § 14.3, at 350,
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Not surprisingly, most laws pass this test. Thus, the complaint often
arises that minimum scrutiny amounts to no scrutiny at all.' 7
The 1974 Constitution- The Individual Dignity Clause
Louisiana's equal protection law begins with the inclusion of the
individual dignity clause, Louisiana's express equal protection provision,
in the Constitution of 1974. The Declaration of Rights committee, which
authored the individual dignity clause, enumerated categories of protected
classes in an effort to avoid perceived abuses by the courts in not
affording enough protection to the individual.' 8 The drafters intended
that when a law that classifies on the basis of birth, age, sex, culture,
physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations is challenged under
the individual dignity clause, the person seeking to have the law upheld
must prove the constitutionality of the law. 19 In the drafters' view, laws
stating.that "if a classification is of this type [classifications of persons in terms of general
economic legislation] the Court will ask only whether it is conceivable that the classification
bears a rational relationship to an end of government which is not prohibited by the
Constitution."
17. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319, 96 S.
Ct. 2562, 2569 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("For that test [mere rationality], ...
when applied as articulated, leaves little doubt about the outcome; the challenged legislation
is always upheld.") See also Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1105; Shaman, supra note 4. Professor
Tribe has characterized the Supreme Court, using rational basis scrutiny, as employing
"near-absolute deference to legislative judgment." L. Tribe, supra note 4, § 16-3, at 1445.
Recently, the Supreme Court, in occasionally striking down economic legislation or
zoning ordinances, has handed down decisions where use of what purports to be a rational
basis scrutiny has nevertheless had a bit of a "bite" to it. See, e.g., City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985); United States Dept.
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 93 S. Ct. 2821 (1973). See also Hooper v. Bernalillo
County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 105 S. Ct. 2862 (1985). Cf. San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973) (education is not a fundamental
right for equal protection purposes).
18. As Delegate Chris J. Roy, one of the clause's authors, observed on the floor of
the Constitutional Convention,
We feel that we have to enumerate these various rights because we think that
our citizens are entitled to have our court protect them in the future. It's been
too many times that even the Supreme Court of the United States has dodged
the issue with respect to equal protection. We want to make sure that our
justices can clearly understand that when you're going to discriminate against
a person for any one of these categories, then the state must show a reasonable
basis for it. We consider that even for the physical condition .... That's the
reason why we consider those categories, we don't want the courts to be confused
anymore.
Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973, supra note 3, at 1017.
19. Convention Delegate Chris J. Roy, a member of the committee charged with
drafting the individual dignity clause, noted:
I just thought of the other reason why we enumerated ... if you're going to
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classifying on the basis of race, religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations
should be unconstitutional on that basis alone. The Constitution of 1974
incorporated section 3 of article 1, the individual dignity clause.
Eleven years elapsed from the adoption of that clause until the
supreme court handed down the Sibley opinion. During that time no
court acknowledged that the Louisiana Constitution provided a vehicle
for expanding its citizens' right to equal protection. Louisiana courts
still used the federal three-tiered model to analyze claims of unequal
treatment. 20
THE SIBLEY FRAMEWORK
The supreme court charted its new course for equal protection in
Sibley,2 decided in September, 1985. The case involved a young woman
who, while a patient of the LSU Medical Center in Shreveport, "suffered
permanent, devastating mental and physical injuries" 2 2 caused by the
malpractice of the attending staff psychiatrist. 23 Louisiana law limited
malpractice awards against the state to an amount that was significantly
lower than Ms. Sibley's actual damages. 24 The trial court and court of
appeal had held that the statutory limitation applied in this case, and
both courts had limited the plaintiff's recovery to the statutory maximum.
Ms. Sibley appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, arguing the medical
malpractice damage award cap violated her right to equal protection
just not state the category, then a person who claims discrimination on a basis
of any one of these things later on, has the burden of showing that he is in
a class that is being discriminated against without that class having been spe-
cifically named. Once we name the class, the burden is not on that individual
to prove that he is of a class against whom discrimination is being applied,
but he simply goes into court, says I am discriminated against, I do fit into
this category, and it shifts the burden of proof to the state to show the reasonable
basis for the discrimination.
Id. at 1018.
20. See, e.g., Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 462 So.
2d 149, 155, rev'd, 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985); Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475,
483 (La. 1981); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978). See also Succession of
Robins, 349 So. 2d 276 (La. 1977). Succession of Robins was one of the first pron-
ouncements by the supreme court after the new constitution was adopted. The court,
rather perfunctorily, took notice of the new equal protection language contained in the
individual dignity clause and then returned to the traditional federal analysis.
21. 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985).
22. Id. at 1098.
23. The psychiatrist attending her case misdiagnosed Ms. Sibley's depression as psy-
chosis. Anti-psychotic drugs were administered over a period of weeks, culminating in
cardio-pulmonary arrest and massive brain damage.




under article I, section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution. 25 On original
hearing, 26 the supreme court affirmed the lower courts' holdings, finding
no violation of equal protection. On rehearing, however, the court
extensively revised its equal protection analysis. The case was remanded
for the trial court to determine the constitutionality of the statute in
light of the new test.27
The Sibley court based its action on two grounds. First, in its
opinion, the supreme court echoed many commentators' objections to
the federal approach, including the perceived rigidity of the federal
framework, its internal inconsistency, and its tendency to retard con-
stitutional analysis by diverting thought away from the weighing of
interests inherent in deciding an equal protection issue. 2 Second, the
drafters of the individual dignity clause had contemplated a change in
favor of broader protections for the individual. Hence, the federal model
was flawed and its use in applying the individual dignity clause did not
accord with the intention of the drafters of the Louisiana Constitution.
So, the court concluded, "[tihe federal jurisprudence should not be used
as a model for the interpretation or application of that part of the
Louisiana Declaration of Rights dealing with individual dignity." 2 9 To
alleviate the perceived problems with the federal model and to afford
the increased protection the drafters had intended, the court formulated
a new framework that closely follows the wording of article I, section
3 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.
The court arranged this new analytical framework into three parts. 0
First, laws that classify persons by race or religious beliefs are to be
"repudiated completely" because these laws make use of "absolutely
forbidden classifications. ' 31 Second, laws that group individuals under
one of the enumerated classifications of the second sentence of the
individual dignity clause are presumed unconstitutional "unless the state
or other advocate of the classification shows that the classification has
a reasonable basis."13 2 The proponent's burden is to prove that "the
25. For a discussion of the argument that there was a violation of equal protection,
see infra note 32.
26. 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985).
27. On remand, there was no further action taken by the trial court, the suit apparently
being settled by the parties. "Although officially not a part of this record, we were
advised that a compromise agreement was reached and that the district court took no
further action in Sibley." Deegan v. Raymond Int'l Builders, Inc., 518 So. 2d 1082 n.l
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1987).
28. Sibley, 477 So. 2d 1094, 1105 (La. 1985).
29. Id. at 1107.
30. Id. at 1109.
31. Id. at 1108.
32. Id. at 1107. For a list of these classifications, see the text of the individual dignity
[Vol. 49
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legislative classification substantially furthers a legitimate state pur-
pose." 33 The state or other advocate of the classification rebuts this
presumption by proving that the law, despite its adverse effect on an
enumerated class, "substantially furthers an appropriate state interest."
3 4
Finally, laws that impact upon an individual by use of a classification
other than those enumerated in the clause violate the individual dignity
clause when a member of the disadvantaged class, now bearing the
burden of proof, shows the law "does not suitably further any appro-
priate state interest."3
SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION OF THE SIBLEY TEST
The question remaining is whether the Sibley test has, in fact, resulted
in greater protection of the individual than under the federal framework.
The ensuing three years have afforded the courts ample opportunity to
employ Sibley. The courts have met the opportunity with varying degrees
of success. While some courts have applied the Sibley analysis correctly,
in many cases the new test has been either ignored or applied incor-
rectly.3 6 As a result, the status of equal protection in Louisiana is
unsettled, making it difficult to discern whether any true change has
taken place.3 7
clause at supra note 2.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.39 (Supp. 1988), which limited Ms. Sibley's recovery
to $500,000 was found by the supreme court to group Ms. Sibley under the enumerated
classification of physical condition. The court found that the statute created two classes
of malpractice victims:
The law on its face is designed to impose different burdens on different classes
of persons according to the magnitude of damage to their physical condition.
The statute creates two classes: one, a group of malpractice victims each of
whom has suffered damage that would oblige a defendant under our basic law
to repair it by paying in excess of 500,000 dollars; another, a class consisting
of victims whose damages would not require an award over this amount to
make individual reparation . . . . Damage to the physical condition of each
malpractice victim is the primary element of his damage and a primary cause
of his being assigned to one of the two classes. Thus, the statutory classification
disadvantages or discriminates against one class of individuals by reason of or
because of their physical condition.
477 So. 2d at 1108-09. While this analysis may or may not seem persuasive, the court
clearly articulated the standard of review it wished to use in Ms. Sibley's case. Thus, the
standard of review to be employed by the trial court on remand was a presumption of
unconstitutionality with the burden on the state to show that this classification substantially
furthered a legitimate state purpose.
33. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1109.
34. Id. at 1107-08.
35. Id.
36. See supra note 6.
37. Most of the cases discussed in this paper have been decided in the past year and
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The Louisiana Supreme Court Settles on an Approach
Since the Sibley decision, the supreme court has decided several
equal protection cases. Following some vacillation on how best to ap-
proach such cases, the court has settled upon the Sibley test as the
proper analysis. The initial stumble came in In re Beychok,38 a case
decided just months after Sibley. There the Louisiana Supreme Court
failed to use its new equal protection test; relying instead on the recently
rejected federal standard. The case involved a member of the LSU Board
of Supervisors, Mr. Sheldon Beychok, who had transacted business with
the University. The Commission on Ethics for Public Employees found
that Mr. Beychok had violated certain provisions of the ethics code by
such contracts. 9 Mr. Beychok appealed to the first circuit court of
appeal, 40 which concluded that the commission had erred in finding a
violation of the ethics code. The supreme court, however, concluded
that the commission had not denied Mr. Beychok equal protection of
the law, reversing the lower court's holding.
This otherwise fairly routine equal protection case is of significant
interest because the supreme court temporarily abandoned the Sibley test
and returned to the federal model of analysis. 4' Ironically, the court
looked to the original hearing of Sibley, 42 which had used the federal
analysis, not to the new Sibley analysis. Chief Justice Dixon, writing
a half, the time period marking the beginning recognition by the courts and the bar that
Sibley is the quintessential case on equal protection in Louisiana. See, e.g., Williams v.
Kushner, 524 So. 2d 191 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ granted, 526 So. 2d 785 (1988); Deegan
v. Raymond Int'l Builders, Inc., 518 So. 2d 1082 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987), writ denied,
523 So. 2d 232 (1988); Allen v. Burrow, 505 So. 2d 880 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,
507 So. 2d 229 (1987).
38. 495 So. 2d 1278 (La. 1986).
39. Wolf Baking Company, where Mr. Beychok served as president, chief executive
officer, and majority shareholder, had entered into a series of contracts with LSU over
a four year period in which it sold bread and bakery products to the university. The
Commission on Ethics for Public Employees issued an opinion, which Mr. Beychok had
requested, in which it advised that Louisiana Revised Statutes 42:1111 C(2)(d), 1112 B(2)-
(3); and 1113 B prohibit members of the Board of Supervisors from entering into contracts
for the sale of goods and services to LSU. A public hearing was held where it was
determined that Mr. Beychok and Wolf Baking Company had violated the above statutes.
40. 484 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
41. 495 So. 2d at 1282-83. Cf. State v. Barberousse, 480 So. 2d 273 (La. 1985),
where the Supreme Court acknowledged Sibley as authority on equal protection. It then
found constitutional Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 893.1, which provides
for mandatory minimum sentences when a defendant is found to have used a firearm in
the commission of a felony. The court, due to some imprecise language, gave the impression
that it was employing federal standards when it found a "rational relation" between the
law in question and a "valid governmental objective."
42. As explained previously, Sibley on original hearing, had employed traditional
federal analysis to the equal protection claim. See supra note 1.
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for the court, first decided that neither a fundamental right nor a suspect
classification was involved. Accordingly, he used the minimum scrutiny
test to find guidance for the correct application of the rational basis
test. The opinion concluded, "[I1f a mere rational basis analysis is
applicable, the United States Supreme Court has declared that the con-
stitutional safeguard of equal protection is invoked only if the classi-
fication rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the
State's objective." 43
For two reasons, Beychok is best regarded as an anomaly in Louis-
iana equal protection jurisprudence. First, the attorneys in the case never
directed the court's attention to the new approach. Mr. Beychok's at-
torneys did not brief the court on Sibley, preferring to rest their equal
protection argument on federal authority," and opposing counsel er-
roneously cited the supreme court to the original hearing of Sibley rather
than to the case on rehearing. 45 Second, the court returned to the Sibley
analysis almost immediately. Two weeks after the Beychok opinion was
handed down, the court decided Crier v. Whitecloud,46 in which the
equal protection claim was decided under the new Sibley analysis.
The Crier court, acknowledging that Sibley controlled the deter-
mination of equal protection claims, entrenched the Sibley analysis in
Louisiana jurisprudence. 47 The Crier court concerned itself with the
alleged unconstitutionality of a Louisiana statute48 that imposes a three-
year prescriptive period on medical malpractice actions with no possibility
of invoking the judicial doctrine of contra non valentem.4 9 The plaintiff
argued that such a statute violated the individual dignity clause.
43. 495 So. 2d at 1283 (citing Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State
University, 462 So. 2d 149, 156 (La.), rev'd on reh'g, 477 So. 2d 1094 (1985)).
44. See Brief for Appellee at 27, In Re Beychok, 495 So. 2d 1278, 1278 (La. 1986)
(No. 86-C-0523).
45. Brief for Appellant at 13, 24 & 30. Beychok, 495 So. 2d at 1278. However
unfortunate the use of the wrong case is, such errors are not the sole province of the
courts. See, e.g., Comment, The Louisiana Constitution's Declaration of Rights: Post-
Hardwick Protection for Sexual Privacy?, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 767 (1988) (where the author
conducted an equal protection analysis using the original hearing rather than the Sibley
rehearing where the new framework for analysis was first introduced).
46. 496 So. 2d 305 (La. 1986).
47. However inauspicious its beginning, the Sibley test has been, and continues to
be, the law of Louisiana. This writer has alluded to inconsistencies in the opinion on
rehearing. See supra note 32. Nevertheless, for purposes of this comment, the test as
promulgated in Sibley will be regarded as the proper framework for analysis of equal
protection claims. See, e.g., Parker v. Cappel, 500 So. 2d 771 (La. 1987).
48. La. R.S. 9:5628 (1983). This statute was amended in 1987, to insert "psychol-
ogists" into the enumerated list of medical providers covered under the statute. The other
minor grammatical changes should have no effect on the law.
49. Contra non valentem agere nulla currit prescriptio means: no prescription runs
against a person unable to bring an action. Black's Law Dictionary 296 (5th ed. 1979).
19891
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Justice Marcus, writing for the court, acknowledged Sibley as the
appropriate standard and resolved the question accordingly. 0 He began
the analysis by determining that medical malpractice victims do not fall
into any of the classifications enumerated in the individual dignity clause.
Since they do not, the court presumed the constitutionality of the statute
and placed the burden of proof that it did "not further an appropriate
state interest" on the challenger. The court next noted that since the
plaintiff had offered no evidence to meet her burden of proof she had
not shown that the statute violated the individual dignity clause.5'
So far, the Crier court had scrupulously followed the Sibley ap-
proach. But upon reaching the issue whether the case should be re-
manded, the court allowed strains of the federal analysis into its opinion.
In the words of the court: "A remand to the district court to afford
plaintiff the opportunity to present evidence to carry her burden would
serve no useful purpose because of the minimal level of scrutiny involved
and the apparent state interest furthered by the statute. '5 2
The language used by the court in its denial of remand is seriously
flawed." As Justice Dennis pointed out in his dissent, the court's con-
clusion that a remand is useless "means that, because the minimal level
of scrutiny is the same under the state constitution as under the federal,
and because the lowest level of scrutiny is virtually nonexistent under
current interpretation of the federal constitution, the plaintiff's complaint
would receive no scrutiny whatever upon remand."54 Clearly, the court's
perception of the sufficiency of an apparent state interest being furthered
renders the analysis equivalent to the federal test of minimum scrutiny.
Upon such a finding under the federal analysis, the inquiry as to
constitutionality is almost routinely resolved in favor of the statute. 55
Under Sibley, however, such minimal scrutiny is insufficient.
While the majority in Crier was taken to task by Justice Dennis
for what he perceived, at best, as the court's lack of proficiency in
using Sibley, there was accord nevertheless in the realization that Sibley
is now the controlling jurisprudence in the area of equal protection
despite intimations in Beychok to the contrary.
The incongruity between the Crier court's analysis of the equal
protection issue and its resolution of the remand issue, when combined
with the aberrant Beychok decision, may have raised a question about
the vitality of the new approach to equal protection. The supreme court
50. 496 So. 2d at 310.
51. Id. at 311.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 313.
54. Id. (Dennis, J., dissenting).
55. See sources cited supra note 17.
[Vol. 49
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dispelled any such doubts in its recent Kirk v. State 6 decision. In that
case, Mr. Kirk, who had been indicted in federal court on charges of
mail fraud, wished to record confidential conversations for his defense.
A Louisiana statute, however, prohibits recording confidential conver-
sations without prior consent from all parties.5 7 Because this statute
excepts law enforcement agencies," Kirk sought a judgment declaring
that the statute violated the individual dignity clause of the Louisiana
constitution.
In determining the issue, the Kirk court stated the Sibley test and
applied it unwaveringly. The supreme court first held that the statute
did establish a discriminatory classification, that of the criminally ac-
cused.5 9 Citing Sibley, the court noted that "[t]he appropriate inquiry
is whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered
by the classification created by the governmental action in question. 60
Since the "the criminally accused" is an unenumerated classification,
the court correctly placed the burden of proof on Mr. Kirk, 61 requiring
him to show that the law was not suitably furthering any appropriate
state interest. The court found that "no apparent governmental interest ' 62
was being furthered, and accordingly struck down the statute.
It seems fairly obvious that there was a governmental interest being
furthered, that of arming prosecutors with evidentiary weapons unequaled
by the defendant. The opinion, thus, tacitly admits that there was a
state interest being furthered, albeit an inappropriate one, and evidences
the court's inability to find an appropriate one. 63 Certainly, under the
Sibley formula, a theoretically sounder holding would be that this was
not an appropriate governmental interest. Regardless, the supreme court
found that such fundamental unfairness could not be allowed. The statute
was found unconstitutional as violating the criminally accused's right to
equal protection of the laws. Had the federal analysis been used, the
law would have received minimum scrutiny, requiring the plaintiff to
show that the law bears no rational relation to the legislature's goals.
56. 526 So. 2d 223 (La. 1988).
57. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:322.1 A., as enacted by 1986 La. Acts No. 97, §
1, reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, intentionally and without the consent of
all parties to a confidential communication, to eavesdrop upon or record such
confidential communication by means of any electronic amplifying or recording
device, whether such communication is carried on among such parties in the
presence of one another or by means of a telegraph, telephone or other device.
58. Id. at D(3).
59. 526 So. 2d at 226. See La. R.S. 14:322.1 C.
60. 526 So. 2d at 226-27.
61. Id.
62. 526 So. 2d at 227 (emphasis added).
63. See infra note 70.
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Neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is implicated,
thus strict scrutiny would be inappropriate. 64 Certainly, the law is ra-
tionally related to the legislature's effort to aid law enforcement's in-
vestigatory techniques. Under this minimum scrutiny, there is no need
for any balancing of the state's interests against those of the adversely
impacted individual. 65 Therefore, such a law undoubtedly would have
been upheld under a federal analysis, while it was not under the Sibley
analysis.
The Sibley Test: Use of Classifications and Shifting Burdens of Proof
The Sibley test is best viewed as a two-tiered model of inquiry. The
first inquiry is whether the aggrieved person fits within a particular
enumerated category. Laws that classify on the basis of "race or religious
64. See supra notes 9 and 10.
65. The Pennsylvania Superior Court considered the constitutionality of a nearly
identical statute in Commonwealth v. Harvey, 348 Pa. Super. 544, 502 A.2d 679 (1985).
The defendant had been convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver. On appeal he argued the unconstitutionality of Pennsylvania's "Wiretapping and
Electronic Surveillance Control Act," 18 Pa. C.S. § 5704, which allows investigative or
law enforcement officers and their agents to intercept and record confidential commu-
nications as long as one of the parties consents to the recording, yet denies the same
right to the criminally accused. Initially, the court declined appellant's suggestion that it
interpret Pennsylvania's state constitutional provisions as providing greater protection than
the U.S. Constitution.
The appellant's argument rested primarily upon the Fourth Amendment, the recording,
in his view, constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. The court's opinion is
nonetheless significant for the breadth of the language used when discussing constitutional
protections:
[The Fourth Amendment's] constitutional guarantee does not extend to or prevent
a recording of the conversation in order to preserve the same for use in law
enforcement activity. Nothing in contemporary constitutional thinking suggests
otherwise.
Similarly, there is no merit in appellant's argument that the statute creates a
constitutionally impermissible balance in favor of law enforcement officials by
allowing them to record incriminating conversations of citizens while denying
citizens the correlative right to record exculpatory statements. There is no basis
in law for the bald assertion that for every legislatively endorsed or created
investigative technique for use by law enforcement officials there must be a
correlative and offsetting right by which criminals can conceal their illegal
activities.
348 Pa. Super. at 555, 502 A.2d at 684 (emphasis added). The Louisiana Supreme Court
obviously does not subscribe to this view. While the Pennsylvania court found no basis
in law for such an argument, the Kirk court did. It was able to use the Louisiana
Constitution's individual dignity clause to declare an identical law unconstitutional while
the Pennsylvania Superior Court could not.
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ideas, beliefs, or affiliations ' 66 are banned completely by the individual
dignity clause. Accordingly, a court should inquire no further once it
determines that a law discriminates on the basis of race or religious
beliefs. 67 Laws that classify according to "birth, age, sex, culture, phys-
ical condition, or political ideas or affiliations" 6 are not prohibited,
but the state or other advocate of the law is burdened with proving
the constitutionality of the law. Laws that create a classification, but
not one of those enumerated in the individual dignity clause, are pre-
sumptively constitutional, that is, the burden shifts to the challenger to
show that the law violates his or her right to equal protection of the
laws. In short, the first step in the Sibley analysis, categorization,
determines whether any proof of the law's constitutionality will be
required and, if so, whether the burden shifts to the proponent of the
law or instead remains on the challenging party.
The second inquiry, once it is determined which party bears the
burden of proof, is whether the burden has been satisfied. If the ag-
grieved individual fits into one of the enumerated categories, the advocate
of the law, most often the state, has the burden of proving both that
the law is supported by an appropriate state interest and that this interest
is being suitably furthered. Likewise, if the court determines that the
disadvantaged individual is within a classification not enumerated in the
clause, then Sibley mandates that the law "be rejected whenever a
member of a disadvantaged class shows that it does not suitably further
any appropriate state interest." '69 A challenger could attack the law in
one of two ways. He can allege and attempt to show (1) the state
interest is not appropriate; or (2) the law does not suitably further the
interest .70
66. La. Const. art. I, § 3. For the full text of this provision, see supra note 2. There
has been an understandable lack of jurisprudence in this area; presumably the legislature
occupies itself with more useful endeavors than passing per se unconstitutional laws.
It is acknowledged by many commentators that imposition of strict scrutiny in the
federal analysis is nearly always fatal. See supra note 17. Thus, it is difficult to discern
any difference between Louisiana and federal treatment of laws when race or religion are
the basis for the discrimination.
67. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1107.
68. La. Const. art. I, § 3. For the full text of this provision, see supra note 2.
69. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1107-08.
70. Cf. Allen v. Burrow, 505 So. 2d 880 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 507 So.
2d 229 (1987). The plaintiff in that case argued that Louisiana Civil Code article 2315
discriminated against the elderly by limiting the class of plaintiffs entitled to bring the
survival action. The second circuit correctly stated the Sibley test and placed the burden
of proof on the plaintiff. The court went on: "The approach is to focus on the specific
merits of the individual case[,] which necessarily entails a balancing or comparative
evaluation of governmental and individual interests." By "balancing and comparing these
respective interests with individual interests," the court concluded that the plaintiff had
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Obviously, there must be some examination of what the terms "ap-
propriate state interest" and "suitably furthers" mean in order to gain
an appreciation of what this inquiry entails.
Appropriate State Interest
While a court hearing an equal protection argument may conclude
that the law under attack suitably furthers the state's interests, it must
also consider whether or not the asserted interest is an appropriate one.
There is a dearth of case law in Louisiana addressing what constitutes
an inappropriate state interest.7" Neither Sibley, Crier, nor Kirk artic-
ulated any particular rule, and scant other guidelines are available. The
question is probably best left to the trier of fact, who can call upon
his appreciation of what interests are appropriate. The trier of fact will
be aided by either a presumption of appropriateness or of inappropri-
ateness, depending on what kind of classification the law employs. For
example, when the proponent of the law bears the burden of proof
because the law in question uses one of the individual dignity clause's
enumerated classifications, the presumption of unconstitutionality should
include a presumption that the state's interest is inappropriate as well. 72
Suitably Furthers
In many of the post-Sibley decisions, courts have tended to revert
to the pre-Sibley analysis in cases where the legislative classification is
not one of those enumerated in article 1, section 3. The Latona v.
Department of State Civil Service7l decision presents an example of this
tendency. In that case, the first circuit reverted completely to the min-
not shown that the classification had failed to suitably further an appropriate interest.
As more courts recognize and employ the Sibley test, this "balancing" approach may be
furthered developed.
71. See Kirk v. State, 526 So. 2d 223 (La. 1988); Deegan v. Raymond Int'l Builders,
518 So. 2d 1082 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987), writ denied, 523 So. 2d 232 (1988).
72. Compare this view with Deegan, 518 So. 2d 1082, wherein the court, while using
the Sibley test, made the opposite presumption. The question before the court was whether
an injured worker plaintiff who has not lost fifty percent or more use of a limb is denied
equal protection by a law which requires fifty percent loss of use before the worker can
recover under the workman's compensation statute, La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(q) (Supp. 1988).
Judge Gaudin wrote for the court, "Presumably such statutory distinctions serve legitimate
public interest." 518 So. 2d at 1085. Because the court had accepted the plaintiff's
argument that he had been placed in a category according to physical condition, it should
have noted that Sibley specifically does not allow presumptions of this kind. The burden
is on the state to prove the constitutionality of its statute.
73. 492 So. 2d 27 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 496 So. 2d 1043 (1986).
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imum scrutiny test. At issue was a civil service plan74 that grouped
employees according to their experience. The court upheld the scheme
because a "rational basis" existed for the rule, "and the basis is rea-
sonably related to a valid governmental purpose." ' 7 Obviously this is
the federal minimum scrutiny standard rejected in Sibley. Had the court
applied Sibley correctly, Mr. Latona need only have proven that the
state interest in the scheme was not being "suitably furthered." In Stuart
v. City of Morgan City,76 the first circuit distorted the Sibley analysis
by creating a hybrid between the federal test and the Sibley test. The
court addressed whether two Louisiana statutes granting limited tort
immunity to certain landowners violated an injured person's right to
equal protection. 77 Relying on the original hearing of Sibley, 78 which
used the federal analysis, the court found that the plaintiff's right to
sue in tort was not a "fundamental right." ' 79 Further, it found that the
statutes in question "rationally further" a state purpose. 0 Finding that
the "furthering" had been proved, the court held that there was no
equal protection violation."' Perhaps the Stuart court sought to steer a
middle course with this unusual splicing of the federal "rational relation"
test with the Sibley "suitably furthers" criterion. Whatever the court's
purpose, the test it used contradicts the pronouncements of the Louisiana
Supreme Court, and hence this new hybrid test should be ignored.
While the first circuit in Stuart and Latona stated the test incorrectly,
the fourth circuit, in Williams v. Kushner,"2 announced the right test
but applied it incorrectly. The Williams court considered whether a
74. The State Civil Service Commission determined that employees classified as State
Engineer III's should be compensated at a higher rate than Engineering Specialist III's.
Plaintiffs attacked the classification on equal protection grounds. The court, citing La.
Const. art. X, § 10(A)(4), acknowledged that Civil Service rules have the force and effect
of law in Louisiana, and conducted its analysis as it would for any other law. 492 So.
2d at 28.
75. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
76. 504 So. 2d 934 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
77. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2791 A (1965) and 2795 B (Supp. 1988) relieve a
landowner of personal tort liability and preclude the victim from maintaining a cause of
action whenever the landowner opens his land to the public for recreational use, unless
the landowner is guilty of a willful or malicious failure to warn of a dangerous condition
on the premises.
78. 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985).
79. Stuart, 504 So. 2d at 941. Under the Sibley test, there is no inquiry whether or
not the right being adversely impacted is "fundamental." Only under the federal analysis
does the court look to see whether a fundamental right is impacted such that strict scrutiny
is warranted. See supra notes 9 and 11 and accompanying text.
80. 504 So. 2d at 941.
81. The court did not indicate whether the burden of proof had been placed on the
state, the advocate of the law's constitutionality, or on Mr. Stuart, the challenger.
82. 524 So. 2d 191 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ granted, 526 So. 2d 785 (1988).
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Louisiana law"3 that limited recovery in medical malpractice cases denied
a victim equal protection. The court identified which of the three clas-
sifications fit the plaintiff, deciding that "an injured medical malpractice
claimant is an individual who has been discriminated against because of
physical condition.''84 Having made that determination, the court chose
the correct standard of review for enumerated classifications. "Apparently,
the rationale [of Sibley] is that if there is good reason for the classification
and if the classification substantially furthers a legitimate state purpose,
then it is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable."85
So far, the analysis had tracked Sibley fairly closely, but upon reaching
the question whether the state's interest had been sufficiently advanced,
the court badly misstated the test. The plaintiff urged the court to look
at the effects of the law in making the "suitably furthers" determination.
Ignoring the plaintiff's sound argument, the court held, "Whether the
statute has in fact achieved it goals is not the question: the Individual
Dignity clause is satisfied by our conclusion that the legislature could
reasonably have decided that the statute would substantially further a
legitimate state purpose; hence it did not act arbitrarily, capriciously or
unreasonably." 8 6 Thus, while the Williams court acknowledged Sibley as
the appropriate standard, it ignored the express wording of the case. In
the process, the fourth circuit resurrected the federal analysis of minimum
scrutiny, a test that is no longer appropriate in Louisiana. The Williams
court would not consider what the law had actually done, but instead
what the legislature could have believed it could do. The correct inquiry
under Sibley is whether the law suitably furthers an appropriate state
interest, not whether the legislature could reasonably conclude that it
would.
If the individual dignity clause is to accomplish its goal of affording
more protection to the individual, "suitable further[ing]" of a state
interest must be a more stringent standard than "rational relation" to
a state interest. If courts are going to remain true to the Sibley case
and the express language of the individual dignity clause, "suitably
83. La. R.S. 40:1299.42(B)(1). This $500,000 limitation is the same subject of Jane
Sibley's appeal in 1985. While on remand to the district court, it appears that the case
was settled before the trial court made any ruling as to the constitutionality of this
limitation. See Deegan v. Raymond Int'l Builders, Inc., 518 So. 2d 1082, 1085, n.l (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1987), writ denied, 523 So. 2d 232 (1988).
84. 524 So. 2d at 194.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 196 (emphasis added). The fourth circuit recently reiterated this view in
Whitnell v. Menville, 525 So. 2d 361, 363 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), writ granted, 530
So. 2d 553 (1989), where it said, "We held in Williams that a statute need not have in
fact achieved the intended purpose if the legislature reasonably believed that the enactment
would further the intended purpose."
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further[ed]" must require that the law in question actually accomplish
an appropriate state interest. Certainly laws accomplish state goals with
varying degrees of success. However, the courts should ensure as a
threshold matter that the law under attack has accomplished, with at
least a minimal amount of success , the state's goals. To be satisfied
with anything less returns equal protection to the same "reasonably
related to a valid governmental purpose" standard of federal analysis
that Sibley rejected.
SUMMATION
Sibley was handed down in September, 1985. In the ensuing three
years, the Louisiana courts have had substantial opportunity to make
use of its wisdom. In large part, they have not done so. Some courts,
by continuing to use the federal three-tiered analysis, have impeded the
change the Sibley court sought. Other courts have used Sibley incorrectly,
acknowledging presumptions of constitutionality where none ought to
exist, or employing a minimum level of scrutiny where the Louisiana
Constitution and Sibley clearly require more. Although the supreme
court seems to have settled on the Sibley approach, it has sent out
mixed signals.17
In Louisiana, the Sibley case has passed largely unnoticed through
the legal community. 8 This is unfortunate because the goal of Sibley
was to afford the increased protections mandated by the individual
dignity clause of the Louisiana Constitution and to provide a more
open, honest, and less rigid vehicle for ensuring equal protection of the
laws. Somewhat belatedly, the courts are now beginning to take notice
of Sibley. 9 Correct use of the Sibley test, however, has been rare. When
the courts have used Sibley in the past, it usually has been with little
accuracy and little appreciation for the test promulgated by the supreme
court. Since Sibley is, as far as the Louisiana Supreme Court is con-
cerned, settled law, lower courts should apply it more diligently and
much more carefully.
Michael Lester Berry, Jr.
87. See, e.g., In Re Beychok, 495 So. 2d 1278 (La. 1986). See supra text accompanying
notes 38 through 44.
88. See supra note 36.
89. See supra note 37.
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